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Some Reflections on How Bedouin Women 
of the Negev Relate to Politics: Between Political 
Marginalization and Social Mobilization 
 





The approximately 130,000 Bedouin currently living in the Negev represent 
13% of the Arab citizens of Israel who in turn constitute 20% of the total Israeli 
population. This minority, albeit Sunni Muslim of Arab nationality,
1
 consistently 
proclaims its uniqueness. Even as Israeli Arab citizens unanimously identify 
themselves as Palestinian, the Bedouin refer to their own history and culture that 
of the Bedu, inhabitants of the desert (Baadia), distinct from and different to 
both city-dwellers and other peasant groups in the region. Social and political 
changes that have transformed the Negev since the end of the 19th Century, 
wrought by the administrative reorganization of successive authorities, undid the 
internal organization of the Bedouin community. The Ottoman Empire, the 
British Mandate and then the State of Israel have each, in their turn, reshaped 
Bedouin society, its tribal modus operandi and therefore its political 
management. This social transformation that we will develop further also 
affected the gender relationship and the position of women in relation to politics. 
Since politics, as a method of conflict resolution and as a means of administering 
public business, has changed its nature, the participation of women and their 
modes of expression have also evolved. It is not enough to note that Bedouin 
women are marginalized in a political sphere dominated exclusively by men. It 
is now important to examine the apparent immutability of such a 
marginalization, and alternative forms of social and political mobilization.    
The socio-political organization of the Bedouin population of the Negev is 
not static, and a number of studies assert that there has been a reconfiguration of 
                                                

















 and of the relationship between genders
3
. Since the 19th 
century the evolution of the Bedouin community has been marked by the arrival 
of peasant groups (fellahin) coming from sedentary rural areas of Palestine who 
affiliated themselves to Bedouin goatherds and farmers by renting and working 
their land. Linked by mutual obligations of solidarity and assistance, Bedouin 
and peasants constituted what was called a tribe, which also included families of 
ancient Sudanese slaves ('abid). The tribe was therefore composed of these three 
populations which functioned in a closed relationship but almost never, or rarely, 
had matrimonial exchanges.
4
 In fact, Bedouin were considered nobles and while 
they would never marry their daughters to inferior groups, the daughters of 
fellahin could marry Bedouin. This logic, which still stands today, has 
nonetheless known a good number of exceptions, and is subject to constant 
modification as the space/time context requires. Nevertheless it is evoked by the 
Bedouin themselves as a “Bedouin tradition” which indicates the cultural stake 
and the importance they attach to a collective Bedouin identity that has 
purportedly never changed and will never change. 
The tribe itself as a social and political reference has known modifications 
under the effect of administrative measures taken by the Ottomans, the British 
and then the Israelis.
5
 Under the authority of the Sublime Porte, the Bedouin 
political unit was the Gabila, a confederation of tribes led by a small number of 
Sheikhs. In 1903, the town of Beer Sheva became an administrative center, and 
in 1906, at a time when Bedouin lived by agro-pastoralism the Turks decided to 
draw the borders of seven tribal confederations and thus set in motion a process 
of  sedentarization.   
The process of territorialization was extended under the British who placed 
more political weight on the 'ashira – a smaller tribal unit. The number of 
Sheikhs was multiplied and they were placed in charge of tax collection for the 
British. The atomization of the tribal structure continued further when the 
British-made tribal unit became the standard administrative unit. By the 1930's 
almost 90% of Bedouin were practicing agriculture, which contributed to the 
                                                
2 L. Jakubowska, “Resisting Ethnicity: The Israeli State and Bedouin Identity”, in 
C. Norstrom & J. Martin (eds), The Paths to Domination, Resistance and Terror, 
University of California Press, 1992. A. Meir, As Nomadism Ends, Boulder, 1997. 
C. Parizot, Le Mois de la Bienvenue, unpublished PhD thesis, Paris, EHESS 2001. 
3 G. Lewando Hundt, Women's Power and Settlement: the Effect of Settlement on the 
Position of Negev Bedouin Women. M.A Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1978. 
S. Dinero, “Female Role Change and Male response in the Post-Nomadic Urban 
Environment: the case of the Israeli Negev Bedouin”, Journal of Comparative Family 
Studies, 28 (3), 1997, pp. 248-261. 
4 E. Marx, The Bedouin of the Negev, Manchester University Press, 1967. Chap. 3: 
Composition of a Tribe, pp. 61-80 & Chap. 5: Marriage Patterns, pp. 101-145. 














parcelization of the land and the privatization of resources.
6
 And so the Bedouin 
tribes, by degrees, began to lose their political relevance. 
The process was at once reinforced and reshaped by the Israelis. Following 
the 1948 war, most of the Bedouin were expelled,
7
 and those who remained were 
concentrated into a more compact perimeter north east of Beer Sheva (sayigh), a 
zone that represented only 10% of the area they was previously occupied. The 
Bedouin were granted Israeli citizenship during the 1950's – the Law of 
Citizenship (1952) – and the very notion of belonging to a tribe was assailed 
when the Israeli authorities demanded that each Bedouin register with one of 19 
officially recognized tribes.
8
 19 tribal chiefs (Sheikhs) were then chosen and 
appointed by Israel, sometimes despite the logic of power which had prevailed 
up until that point.
9
 The Sheikhs now acquired considerable power, becoming 
the intermediary between the population and the Israeli authorities; authority 
relationships were overturned and recreated in haste. While the territorialization 
as well as the social organization of the Bedouin froze, they were subjected to 
martial law which lasted until 1966. As in the Arab zone of the Galilee and in 
the Triangle, the Bedouin were placed under the authority of a military 




At the end of the 1960's, Israel altered its political stance vis a vis the 
Bedouin and decided to urbanize them by locating them in planned cities and 
villages. In most cases these settlements were built without prior consultation 
with the people involved, their objective being to gather the Bedouin into urban 
concentrations in order to prevent them spreading out in the Negev.
11
 Beginning 
in 1966, seven settlements were created, that contain today more than half the 
population of the Bedouin in the Negev
12
. The other half live in the so-called 
non-recognized villages on lands which had traditionally been theirs and which 
                                                
6 G. Falah, “The Spacial Pattern of Bedouin Sedentarization in Israel”, Geojournal, 11 (4) 
1985, p. 362. 
7 There were about 95,500 Bedouin in the Negev in 1947. Only 11,000 were left by the 
end of the year 1948. Falah, op.cit., note 6, p. 363. 
8 Among the 19 officially recognized tribes that had been fixed by the Israeli authorities, 
11 came originally from areas that were outside the sayigh. 
9 E. Marx, ibid, note 2, Chap. 2: Administrative Environment, pp. 31-58. A. Meir, op.cit., 
note 2, Chap. 4: Territorialization, pp. 73-105. C. Parizot, op.cit., note 2, pp. 42-48. 
10 Up to 1966, the Arab population of Israel as a whole was placed under military 
administration. The rules were strict: surveillance of the modes of political organization 
and control of movements with traffic permits necessary in order to get out of military 
zones. See I. Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State, Austin, Texas University Press, 1980. 
11  A. Meir, op.cit., note 2, Chap. 4: Territorialization, pp. 73-105. 














the State had nationalized in the 1950's.
13
 A considerable differential opened up 
between the urban, semi-urban and rural, this last enjoying the benefit neither of 
infrastructure nor services. The administration of the planned settlements was 
entrusted to a local authority appointed by the Ministry of Interior. It would not 
be until the 1990's that the organization of the first free elections for Bedouin 
local councils would take place. The urbanization and the socio-economic 
changes that appeared in the 1960's had caused the Israeli-made tribes to 
disintegrate; they lost all political relevance as well as their administrative 
legitimacy. Today, reference to belonging to a tribe has not completely 
disappeared, but it is used occasionally more to recall the familial and territorial 
origin of a lineage.  
The Bedouin socio-political organization has therefore known deep 
upheavals since the end of the 19th C. By becoming Israeli citizens, Bedouin 
entered a new era of reconfiguration which led to the disintegration of their tribal 
system. However in this study there is one point which does not seem to have 
changed: the marginalization of women in political power and public affairs. But 
the immutability is only apparent, because in reality the mechanisms of 
discrimination have changed. While Bedouin society has undergone social and 
political transformation, the relationship of women to the political sphere has 
also changed. Whether we are discussing the pre-Israeli era, the military 
government or the urbanization process, although it would appear that women 
have been completely excluded from the political game, in fact the mechanisms 
of discrimination themselves, and the stake, have undergone successive changes.   
 
I. Power and Politics 
In the first place we need to be precise about the terminology used in this study 
and to distinguish between “power” and “politics.” The study of political modes 
of expression and mobilization is one thing, the analysis of power is quite 
another. In this regard, Lila Abu Lughod (1988, 1990) Cynthia Nelson (1973) 
and Gillian Lewando Hundt (1978) have stressed the modality of the power 
exercised by Bedouin women in the Middle East.
14
 Lila Abu Lughod who 
studied the social and political significance of poems recited by the members of 
                                                
13  The expropriation of the Bedouin was done under the effect of several laws, including 
the Absentee Property Law – 1950 and the Land Acquisition Law – 1953. 
14  L. Abu Lughod, Veiled Sentiments, Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society, Berkeley, 
University of California, 1988; “The Romance of Resistance: Tracing Transformations of 
Power through Bedouin Women,” American Ethnologist, vol. 17, # 1, February 1990, 
pp. 41-55. C. Nelson, The Desert and the Sown. Nomads in the Greater Society, Berkeley 
University of California, 1973. G. Lewando Hundt, Women's Power of Settlement: the 
Effect of Settlement on the Position of Negev Bedouin Women, M.A. Thesis, University of 














the Egyptian tribe Awlad 'Ali tried to demonstrate the forms of resistance used 
by women to masculine domination. She discusses poems – sometimes 
subversive – and the attitude of young girls who, by the way they dress and by 
their refusal to submit to forced weddings, demonstrate that they hold power of a 
kind. Cynthia Nelson has a theory concerning the place of women in the semi-
nomadic way of life of the desert. She demonstrates that women exercise power 
by controlling the Harem, particularly in freely criticizing men and by being in 
charge of matrimonial bargaining. It is the women, mainly the oldest, who 
arrange the unions and exercise power over their juniors. Gillian Lewando 
Hundt has studied the position of women in planned Bedouin townships in the 
Negev. She shows how the urbanization has changed social norms by enclosing 
women in the family cell, but at the same time how this seclusion has allowed 
them to dominate their space and has given them a kind of autonomy from men. 
Each of these studies thus addresses the question of “power” but not that of 
“politics.” This power that women exercise, however influential, is confined to 
the feminine and private space. Women have little or no influence on public 
affairs. This was true in the semi-nomadic setting where the shigg (space for 
men) was still the place for debates and political arrangements, and this is still 
true today where the political parties as well as elected bodies are exclusively 
masculine. Then it was easier for women to circulate and move between spheres, 
thereby informing themselves about the issues of the day.  Today a couple still 
discusses politics and there are secretaries working in the town halls.  Does this 
mean that women, because of their knowledge of political matters, exercise a 
form of political power?  No. It is quite evident that Bedouin women have 
always been aware of what goes on around them, but to claim that they hold 
political power solely because they hold information, would be a gross 
overstatement.  In order to exercise political power, even at an informal level, it 
is not sufficient just to be in the know, you must also be in a position to act.  
Even when Bedouin women exert influence in the social sphere – weddings are 
an example – they are not autonomous in the exercise of this expertise. Again, 
one has to differentiate between political expertise and political involvement,
15
 
the latter being demonstrably circumscribed if not non-existent. Furthermore, it 
is not at all certain that the political expertise Bedouin women have could be 
adapted to the existing political game, given the extent to which it is codified 
and controlled by men today.  
Although women have little access to public politics as it relates to conflict 
resolution and the administration of the affairs of the group, they are politically 
                                                
15 S. Duchesne & F. Haegel, “La politisation des discussions au croisement des logiques 
de spécialisation et de conflictualisation”, Revue française de science politique, vol. 54, 














socialized in the private space and conduct “private politics” by acting within the 
tribal organization and today the familial organization. On the other hand, 
concerning another aspect of politics which corresponds to the collectivization 
of a social question carried into the public arena, here the mobilization of 
women is a more recent phenomenon.  Women's associations, notably national 
and international feminist networks have allowed certain Bedouin women to 
endow social themes with a public dimension, and enabled them to start to play 
the game of the political negotiation, not only with national bodies (the Knesset) 
but also international ones (UN and donors). This is where the novelty of this 
last ten years resides: the access of Bedouin women to the Israeli and 
transnational public arena, employing political tools outside the conventional 




II. Gender and Semi-Nomadic Way of Life: In Search of Politics  
When asking Bedouin women of the Negev about the situation of women before 
the creation of Israel in 1948, one obtains two types of answer:  the old-timers 
describe the difficulty of the semi-nomadic way of life, their participation in 
agro-pastoral tasks, and their exclusion from political matters;   the youngsters 
praise the golden age of Bedouin life, the value of solidarity and 
complementarity as between men and women.  Two visions of history and the 
relationship between sexes. The old-timers readily stress the harsh economic and 
social conditions, herding, farming, collecting water from wells, cooking, 
sewing, and all the other domestic tasks with which women were encumbered. 
They describe the shigg as a public and masculine sphere where men received 
their guests and discussed group business. When asked if they thought they had 
any political influence, the answer is no. First of all because it was an 
exclusively male domain, primarily a masculine skill so much so that they were 
hardly consulted in the decision-making process. Nevertheless there is one 
practice that mitigates this picture:  the women close to the Sheikh – daughters, 
spouses, sisters – were sometimes sent out to inquire, if not to spy, on local 
lineage groups and their social situation. In other words, women were charged to 
go and spend a few days in a tribe to see if there were girls suitable for marriage 
and to examine the economic situation of the group – size of the herd, 
ownership, proximity to well etc. In fact when it came to forging a bond between 
lineages, the matrimonial exchanges were a good way to seal alliances and 
mutual obligations. These delegations were therefore privileged sources of 
                                                
16 Gender dominant groups, but also ethnic or confessional dominant groups — the 
Jewish citizens. We are only talking here of one aspect of the relationship of domination. 
One should not forget the variables of generation, economics, geography, etc., which also 














information which then enabled the sheikh to decide whether a certain alliance 
served his interests. Bedouin women, at least those of them close to the tribal 
chief, were then used as political auxiliaries, and although they could willfully 
orientate their declarations and advise the sheikh in his choices, they still did not 
take the decisions. Once again women had a secondary, background role, 
influential maybe, however dependant on masculine goodwill. If semi-nomadic 
life was characterized by a polarization between the sexes, at once strict in 
public but pliant within the immediate family, the political expression of women 
in the private space does not compensate for their silence in public. 
However the youngsters do not judge their elders with the same severity. 
They praise the courage of the old Bedouin women who lived in particularly 
harsh conditions and they also underline the complementarity between men and 
women since women were helping in physical tasks and working like real 
economic partners. Women in their thirties also talk about the dialogue that 
existed between men and women and about the fact that women were consulted 
about each question related to the life of the group. It seems to be a slightly 
romantic vision of the semi-nomadic life in desert regions; men and women 
acting together, as if fraternity and mutual help define Bedouin life in its 
entirety. In reality, according to the stories told by the old-timers, it is true that 
there was a dialogue between members of the same family, but it was not a 
partnership and there was no political sharing. The pre-Israeli era is therefore 
still characterized in terms of a political marginalization of women and a 
distinction between private and public affairs. What today can be analyzed in 
terms of space or sphere already represented at that time a social and political 
polarization between men and women.  Indeed the structure has changed but the 
patriarchal nature of the gender differentiation remains. 
Furthermore conflict resolution in Bedouin communities follows customary 
practices which involve patrilineal lineage solidarity. Obviously it would be too 
simplistic to characterize Bedouin by their customs. This would mean denying 
the transformation in their practices and the socio-legal environment in which 
they live. Nevertheless the question of blood revenge is a good example of the 
exclusion of women from the codes of conflict resolution. In fact, in case of 
conflict, notably in case of murder between individuals from different lineages, 
the khams acts as a political organ of conflict resolution. The khams gathers all 
the men of patrilineal descent who claim a common ancestor within five 
generations. All these men must in principle help one another and bare a 
collective responsibility for the actions of each one of them. If a member of 
lineage A is killed by a member of lineage B, then the khams of lineage B is 
responsible for paying the debt, haqq al daam (price of blood) in order to resolve 
the conflict. Without entering into the details of a practice that is a lot more 














some conflicts and an exclusively masculine responsibility
17
. In this system 
which results in the payment of the debt, the death or the exile of the guilty 
party, men alone are competent and empowered to negotiate.   
 
III. Tribal Reconfiguration, Urbanization and Professionalization of Politics 
Let us state clearly that these logics or Bedouin norms have undergone many 
changes and their transformation has been under the effects of policies imposed 
by those who exercised authority in the region. One of the most brutal of the 
contemporary modifications, certainly a product of the creation of the State of 
Israel, was the forced departure of the major part of the Negev Bedouin and the 
transformation of the way of life of those who remained. These new Israeli 
citizens were subjected to Military Government within a much reduced territory. 
Modes of political administration were swept away by the imposition of martial 
law, the appointment of salaried Sheikhs – not always representative – and the 
development of a broad system of patronage between local leaders and the 
Israeli authorities.
18
 If the clientelist logic is not new, then patronage such as the 
one that developed at that time was of a new order. In fact, since the 1950's, 
Bedouin became Israeli citizens and they voted in the parliamentary elections of 
1955. In the same manner as in the North, Zionist parties, primarily Mapai – ex-
Labor party – courted the Arab vote, in this case Bedouin vote.
19
 Bargaining for 
the Arab vote was done in exchange of material and symbolic gain. The Arab 
satellite lists affiliated to Mapai were specially created on the eve of the election 
in order to win the Israeli Arab vote. It was in this manner that Arab MPs, such 
as the Bedouin Hamed Abu Rabia, entered the Knesset, elected on a list 
affiliated to Labor at the end of the 1970's. 
The end of the Military Government (1966) saw the creation of planned 
settlements headed by local councils appointed by the Ministry of Interior. The 
mode of political administration of the Bedouin community underwent change; 
the Sheikhs lost their prerogatives and were replaced by administrative and 
                                                
17  For more details about these notions, see E. Marx, op.cit., note 4, Chap. 7: Sections 
and Co-liable Groups, pp. 177-213; E. Marx & A. Shmueli, The Changing Bedouin, 
Transaction Books, 1984; as well as G. Kressel, Descent through Males. An 
Anthropological Investigation into Patterns Underlying Social Hierarchy, kinship and 
Marriage among Former Bedouin in Ramla-Lod Area (Israel), Mediterranean Language 
and Culture Monograph Serie 8, Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1992. 
18 A. Meir, op.cit., note 2, Chap. 8: The Political Dimension: The Bedouin and the State, 
pp. 193-220. 
19 I. Lustick, op.cit., note 10, Chap. 6: Cooptation as a Component of Control: The 
Capture of Arab Elite. Benyamin Neuberger, “The Arab Minority in Israeli Politics 1948-















political councils. Organization by lineage, largely undermined since 1949, 
disappeared and gave way to a form of government officially more rational. A 
conventional political scene therefore evolved even though Bedouin were still 
limited in what they could say and how they could organize politically. They 
voted in national elections mainly for Zionist parties and the satellite lists, but 
they still did not have the vote at the local level which was dominated by a 
Jewish administration. It would not be until 1989 in Rahat, 1993 in Tel as-Saba 
and 2000 in the five other Bedouin settlements that they could hold their first 
free local elections. This whole period was characterized by the domination of 
Zionist groups and patronage relationships among Bedouin, and again women 
take no part in these activities. They were not local leaders and therefore they 
did not participate in the electoral deal-making. Of course they went along with 
the political views of their husbands and family but they had no direct influence. 
The fact that  Bedouin themselves were largely denied any say in their own 
administrative affairs served to marginalize women still further.  A minority 
within an already discriminated against minority, Bedouin women kept their 
distance and were kept distant from the political game. Marginalization which is 
also experienced by other social groups like ancient slaves’ families and other 
groups marginalized from power sphere.  
The change took place in the 1980's with the creation of autonomous Arab 
political parties.
20
 Up till then, only the Rakah communist party, then the Jabha 
(Democratic Front for Peace and Equality)
21
 had represented the Arabs' interests 
in Israel.  Well established in the North, they had not succeeded in penetrating 
the Negev and to be a counterweight to Zionist groups. It was not until the 
formation of Arab political parties in the 1980's that the Bedouin vote became 
autonomous and they started to claim a collective Palestinian identity. National 
elections and then local elections gained in importance and further mobilized the 
Bedouin electorate. Thus Bedouin participation in the elections of 1988 was 
61.3 % compared to 50 % in 1981. At these elections the Arab Democratic Party 
(ADP), that had just been created, gained 43.7 % of the suffrage, while the 
Jabha only received 5.8 % of the Bedouin vote.  At the elections of 1999, the 
Arab parties were made up of the United Arab List – a joint list of the ADP and 
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 Creation in 1984 of the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, that came out of the 
coalition of the Progressive Movement (led by Mohammed Miari) and the Jewish 
movement Alternativa (led by Uri Avneri). Just before the 1988 elections, creation of the 
Arab Democratic Party, led by Abd el-Wahab Darawshe, ex Labor Deputy. 
21
 The Jabha, founded for the 1977 elections, came out of a coalition of several groups, 














the Islamic movement – the Tajammu' – National Democratic Assembly
22
 – and 
the Jabha. These three lists gained more than 70 % of the Bedouin vote.   
Since then, the new successful actor has been the Islamist movement which 
has enjoyed since the 1980's, but mainly in the 1990's, a large social and political 
base in the Negev.  While the ADP has a famous MK, the Bedouin Talab as-
Sana, the Islamic movement is still the most active and the best established 
organization among the Bedouin.  Each settlement has active members of the 
movement that seem to be closer to the moderate branch of Ibrahim Sarsur than 
to the radical branch of Ra'ed Salah.
23
 
The professionalization of politics in the Bedouin milieu implied the creation 
of political parties and politicians. A young educated cadre became the new 
specialists in politics, mastering the wheels of the electoral game and of the 
clientelist horse-trading. Once again women were excluded from this 
transformation because they were neither involved nor invited to participate in 
the political parties, they do not have interests to negotiate and they are not 
familiar with the new tools of the Israeli political system. A Bedouin woman has 
never been elected to a local council or as an MK.
24
 It is important to specify that 
many other social and economic groups remain at the periphery of the political 
game in a Bedouin society who has a strong internal hierarchy.  
The mechanisms of representation and mainly of political expression have 
professionalized themselves, throwing up political technicians who know how to 
play all the solidarities, no matter if they are familial or more materialistic.
25
 
Today local and national elections are built on a network of personal 
connections and interests that is not only founded on lineage, but is integrated 
into other forms of clientelism from which women are even more marginalized. 
They go along with the choices of their father or their husband but they do not 
mobilize themselves autonomously. The proof can be found in the way the 
elections are run, and in the fraudulent practices used.  During the local elections 
in Laqiyya in September 2004, we observed a fraud which was repeated in all 
                                                
22
 Al-Tajammu' al-Watani al-Dimuqrati (National Democratic Assembly) founded in 
1996 from the fusion of the Progressive Movement and part of the radical organization 
Abna al-Balad. It is today led by its charismatic leader, Azmi Bishara.  
23 In fact the Islamic movement which split into two branches in 1996 has a radical 
northern wing that refuses to participate in parliamentary elections, and a moderate 
southern wing which plays the game of the political system and has MKs in the Knesset. 
24
 Since the creation of the Israeli State, 15 women Arab citizens have been elected as city 
counselor and one woman, Violet Khouri, was head of Kufr Yassif local council between 
1972 and 1973. Two Arab women, have been elected deputies: Husnia Jabara from the 
left Zionist party Meretz (1999-2003) and Nadia Hilou from the Labor Party elected 
during the last 2006 elections.   
25
 C. Parizot, op.cit., note 2, Chap. 6 : Le Mois de la Bienvenue : Médiations 
















 Men took the ID cards of certain women, or bought 
their vote, then gave the cards to a trusted woman in charge of voting for all the 
others. This was a way of ensuring the vote of women and to prevent the risk of 
potentially deviant individual expression. As they liked to tell it themselves, the 
cards could be exchanged in an emergency for several hundred, sometimes 
thousands of shekels. Women spent their day changing their cloths to deceive 
the police at the polls and they played this game several times during the day. It 
also happened for certain national elections, women were sent to other 
settlements in order to vote instead of local women. The system was widespread 
and well-polished. The circulation of the cards was done inside the voting office 
next to the rooms where the police officers and the electoral inspectors of the 
Ministry of Interior stood. In this game the Israeli authorities were not duped, 
they knew exactly how the election was being run. But they consciously refused 
to intervene in order to avoid friction with the local population. This fraud was 
practiced as much at national as local elections. The men were organizing the 
fraud and the women are executing it; but once again Bedouin women proved 
that while they participate in their way in the political game they remain 
voluntary auxiliaries still dependant on men. 
The elections in Laqiyya in 2004, however, were marked by a novelty:  the 
presence of a Bedouin woman as an observer at the polling station. In charge of 
preventing irregularities in the voting, she was not afraid to challenge the 
identity of some of the voters, even individuals from her family. Her presence 
was widely criticized by some conservatives but mainly by the organizers of the 
fraud who went as far as threatening her husband if he did not get her to 
withdraw. This scandal offers further confirmation of the political lock-out of 
women and the monopoly that some men would like to keep in order to master 
the system. 
Furthermore, during the electoral campaign no women participated in 
political meetings which were exclusively masculine, and organized in 
headquarters placed on the land of the head of the list. The lists did not follow 
the logic of the familial entirely. If anything, the opposite was observed in the 
elections in Laqiyya in 2004 where members of the same lineage were 
candidates for opposing parties. But, the occasional conflicts within the family 
confirmed the attachment to familial solidarity that was being undermined by 
other types of interests. Women worked for certain lists by approaching their 
female neighbors on behalf of a candidate. In this way, the campaign also has a 
feminine arena, but more discrete, non-professional and circumscribed within 
the private space. It was a matter of informal meetings organized by women, 
                                                














mandated by the heads of the list. They were not political militants but they were 
volunteers who were occasionally mobilized and were always on hand. 
On the other hand a lot more women are active in the network of associations 
of the Islamic movement, and it is here that the border between social and 
political becomes unclear. Many Bedouin women participate in the activities of 
the Islamic movement organized for women. In each Bedouin settlement there 
are those responsible for feminine sections. These women do not participate in 
the elections but they organize debates, religious classes in mosques and the 
collection of donations for the poor notably Palestinians of the Occupied 
Territories. In fact women are active and mobilized as much on cultural 
questions as on social and political. They are not affiliated members, but 
supporters and volunteers. This phenomenon is quite recent and corresponds to 
the process of Islamization of the Bedouin community of the Negev observed 
since the 1970's.
27
 Muslim religious rules are collectively followed and the 
Islamic movement has imposed itself as an indispensable political and social 
actor. Furthermore this highly respectable movement shows interesting practices 
concerning the legitimization of access of women into the public space. Social, 
cultural and political activities of the Islamic movement have become spaces that 
are respectable and appropriate for women. 
 
IV. Social and Feminist Mobilization  
At the end of the 1970's, Israeli society as a whole witnessed the development of 
a large number of associations, able to represent various interests and notably 
those of minority ethnic and religious groups. Several Arab associations were 
thus created in the Negev, such as the Association for Bedouin Rights in 1974. 
The themes of the mobilization are mainly protests against the expropriation of 
Bedouin land, which has become the highest stake in the national struggle of 
Arab citizens. Land Day in September 1976 which started with a one-day 
general strike in the Galilee to protest expropriation of land is a good example. It 
ended up with the death of six Arab citizens. Now, each year on September 30 
this tragic event is commemorated, accompanied by demonstrations and 
conferences on the land question. In 2005, for the first time, this day was 
organized in a non-recognized village of the Negev showing how topical and 
sensitive this matter is in the Bedouin community.  
Some Bedouin women regularly stand shoulder to shoulder with men to 
protest Israeli policy towards the Bedouin of the Negev. In 1996 the inhabitants 
of the non-recognized village of Abdeh were victims of forced expropriations.  
A sit-in of several tens of days was organized at the door of the Knesset in 
Jerusalem. Fadiya Abu Gardud, an old widow was standing next to the Bedouin 
                                                














MK Talab as-Sana. Today she is known throughout the Negev for her active 
participation in this protest. She explains that her action was self-evident, a 
survival instinct to which men are not subject alone, but also women who must 
protect their land for the good of their children and for the preservation of their 
identity.
28
 She therefore refuses to see any political significance in her initiative 
because politics remains a male world, the prerogative of professionals and not 
for those who 'simply' struggle for their survival. 
While strikes and demonstrations have been much on the rise in the 1980's, 
their use has been less prevalent in the Negev. Bedouin do not mobilize 
themselves massively in order to defend their rights or those of the Palestinians 
of the Occupied Territories; notwithstanding the fact that this theme is 
unanimously supported today in an Arab population which publicly claims that it 
is a part of the Palestinian people.
29
 Bedouin also insist on the reference to 
identity, notably among young nationalists, and in the public sphere where there 
is a call to be distinguished from the Jewish Israeli population. Demonstrations 
were therefore organized against the massacre in Lebanon in 1982 in the 
Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Chatilla or in support of the first and the 
second Intifada. Some women have participated in these demonstrations, which 
confirms a recent phenomenon fairly typical of educated young Bedouin women 
who claim their Palestinian identity and their solidarity with the struggle in the 
Occupied Territories. The fact that Bedouin university students, male and 
female, insist that their identity is Palestinian does not mean that they have 
forgotten their Bedouin origin, on the contrary, but they articulate it with an 
identity more politicized and national. Calling yourself a Bedouin is about 
remembering your territorial anchorage and your attachment to the land, whereas 
calling yourself a Palestinian has a more encompassing political connotation 
which leads the Bedouin into an historic, nationalist and far-reaching protest. 
Still, the number of Bedouin women mobilized is still very small and limited 
to certain families of privileged class. In fact the feminine mobilization occurs in 
educated and rich families, mostly urban and with the support of the men of the 
                                                
28  Interview, September 2004. 
29 This subject has been examined in numerous studies dealing with “Palestinization,” or 
even the radicalization of Arab citizens of Israel. See J. Landau, Arab Minority in Israel 
1967-1971: Political Aspects, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993; Y. Peres, “Modernization 
and Nationalism in the Identity of the Israeli Arabs,” Middle East Journal, vol. 24, # 4, 
Autumn 1970; S. Smooha, “The Arab Minority in Israel: Radicalization or 
Politicization?,” Studies in Contemporary Jewry, vol. 5, 1989; A. Bishara, “L'Arabe en 
Israël,” Revue d'études palestiniennes, # 7, Spring 1996; E. Rekhess “Israeli Arabs and 
the Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza: Political Affinity and National Solidarity,” Asian 















lineage. Women's associations have therefore been exclusively created in the 
planned settlements by women coming out of dominant lineages. This is true of 
Laqiyya as well as for all the other towns, systematically these women come 
from dominant families. One had to wait until recent years in order to see the 
development of activities in the non-recognized villages. But most of the time 
they are led by the leaders of the associations of the planned settlements. These 
associations, registered under the Law of Associations (1980), are non-profit and 
offer all kinds of activities and services angled towards women and children: 
Day care centers, Hebrew and Arabic lessons, lectures on various subjects such 
as health, education, domestic violence or the opening of bank accounts and 
financial management of the household.  The two main associations of the 
Negev can be found in Laqiyya. The first one “Nisa Laqiyya” (Women of 
Laqiyya) produces Bedouin embroideries, and the second one, “Jam'iyyat 
Sidreh” (Sidreh Association), manufactures and sells carpets. The craftwork is 
entirely done by women of the village; the goal is to help them to become 
financially independent. The objective of these NGOs is to promote Bedouin 
craftwork in order to defend a cultural heritage and to support local economic 
development. 
Nevertheless some militants of these associations participate in a feminist 
organization called Ma'an (Forum) which was created in 2000 in Beer Sheva 
and whose goal is to defend the rights of Bedouin women. The outlook is one of 
intense engagement and feminism. The organization produces a newspaper and 
participated in 2005 in the writing of a report on the condition of Palestinian 
women in Israel intended for the UN CEDAW committee.
30
 Parallel with the 
official report written by the Israeli authorities on the condition of women in 
Israel, an Arab organization, the Working Group on the Status of Palestinian 
Women in Israel has been producing counter-reports since 2001. For the first 
time this year some Bedouin women with the help of Ma'an have been able to 
participate in this report and to give international visibility to the place of 
women in the Negev. Furthermore Ma'an also expects to write its own 
independent report on Bedouin women and to address the feminine questions 
that are most often marginalized in the Negev: health, employment, education, 
personal status, polygyny and the political role of women. 
To accomplish this, the association is financed with external help from the 
EU and other overseas NGOs.  Recourse to the international scene for the last 
ten years is not only a feature of Bedouin associations but of all organizations 
both Israeli and Palestinian. The involvement of international donors has seen a 
new rise with the success of programs of “Gender and Development,” set in 
motion by the UN and numerous international conferences on development. This 
                                                














phenomenon has in fact changed the configuration of the associations of Arab 
women which seek to comply with the requirements of their foreign donors; to 
conform to their feminist aims. In fact the financing criteria developed are 
essentially inspired by western feminist theories, augmented by new economic 
and political criteria of “good governance.”
31
 In the new quest for democracy in 
the Middle East, women are considered to be the guarantors of social change. 
The associations, once they have polished up their feminist and largely 
depoliticized agendas, they then become a prime target for international 
financing. One of the consequences of the recourse to the international is the 
decontextualization of the priorities and the needs
32
. In trying to change the 
women without changing the context of their discriminations these measures 
extract all trace of potentially nationalist and subversive politics. This explains 
why the associations are often reproached for the fact that they struggle for 
women without taking account of the needs of the community as a whole. 
Another reproach targets the social and political negotiations employed by these 
associations. Some Bedouin men see the recourse by these associations to 
national financial support places them in dangerous proximity to the state 
apparatus.  Equally suspect, they see the influence of Israeli feminists in the 
emphasis the associations place on the patriarchal foundation of Bedouin society 
and the suffering of women.  This is why some acts of sabotage and degradation 
have been carried out against these associations in protest against both the 
activities, the independence of women and their insertion into the Israeli political 
game. In fact, it would be a simplification to think that the reticence of men 
towards the associations of women can only be found in the patriarchal system.  
There also exists some political and social reasons notably of frustration, 
jealousy and mistrust for feminine initiatives that de facto exclude men and are 
supported by Israeli authorities.  
Therefore, not only are Bedouin women not always represented in politics 
they are also practically inactive in the parties. Nevertheless few of them are 
mobilized in the field of associations which have gained in importance and 
which no longer content themselves with offering local services. Today they also 
                                                
31 On a regular basis, international texts relating to the promotion of women are 
reproached for not using feminist terminology. Meaning they are engaged and critical but 
are using a neutral vocabulary. This criticism actually aims directly at the texts from the 
UN. Nevertheless, in the case of associations that are not occidental, one can not deny the 
influence of western values and criteria about equality between men and women. It is in 
this sense that we are talking here of western feminism. 
32 The same analysis has been used on Palestinian women's associations. See 
R. Giacaman, “International Aid, Women's Interests and the Depoliticization of Women,, 















take on a national dimension and have international support. Even if these 
associations have no clear political aim, nevertheless they represent new places 
for women to work, to socialize and participate in social protest.  The 
conventional political arena does not seem to Bedouin women to be a useful and 
respectable sphere of involvement. Opinion which is now shared by lots of Arab 
citizens who do not trust neither have hope in their political representatives. 
People disappointed and marginalized by the system refuse largely to be 
involved. Bedouin women mobilized in civil organizations are young, educated 
and urban (feminist or not), very critics of the political system in the Negev and 
who decide to be involved in other social and economic fields, in aid of women, 
independently of political partisan logics.  
  
(This version has been mainly translated into English 
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